The future� of the U.S. space program Carol White evaluates the prospects for NASA. in the aftermath qf the explosion oj the Space Shuttle Challenger.
The U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate have now begun hearings on the accident and the future of the program. Even according to official government statistics, which vastly undervalue the rate of inflation, the projected budget for NASA calls for a 3.5% cut, when the dollar figure is adjusted for inflation.
The 1986 figure for the NASA budget was $7.65 billion, compared to the proposed $7.69 billion for fiscal '87. The point is not that with the loss of the Shuttle, NASA will need additional funds to rebuild its capabilities; the point is that our space program was being remorselessly whittled away even before the accident.
And under the 4.3 % across-the-board cuts directed by the Gramm-Rudman bill, NASA had already lost $223 million in this year. It may well tum out that there were avoidable errors of judgment involved, connected with allowing the flight to proceed. But every one of the errors so far suggested, can be traced to pressures to perform, placed upon NASA, while money was being held back.
One example, is the problem NASA had in assembling a spare-parts inventory withollt cannibalizing from other orbi ters in the fleet. Or, for that matter, the fact that the fleet itself was one orbiter short of the planned five, and trying to hold to a tight flight schedule.
More to the point, was the fact that from the start the construction of the Shuttle was justified according to criteria _ set by the Office of Management and Budget. Its aim was not to assure the conquest of space; no, its mandate was to be "cost-effective. " Each Shuttle trip was ultimately intended topay for itself from the fees charged for hauling cargo. This year the charge to industry for cargo space was approximately doubled.
This has resulted in a situ!ltion in which commercial users of the Shuttle are billed $71 million to add a commercial satellite to a Shuttle mission, while the cost to NASA can be as low as $43 million if the flight is already scheduled. Poli cies such as this are not being followed by NASA's successful French competitor Ariane, which, appropriately, is govern ment-subsidized for commercial as well as other space flights.
NASA was being forced into the impossible box of being a commercial success by the narrow-minded, free-market ideologues who controlled its budget and determined its pric ing policy. If there were failures of judgment involved in the accident, we can be assured that they WIll trace back to pressures generated by failure to adequately fund the pro gram.
What went wrong?
The following time sequence of the events leading up to the disaster has been released by NASA, compiled from computer data and photographs. The computer data were not available in real time to Mission Control.
6.600 seconds before launch: Challenger's three Jiquid fueled engines fire up one at a time and are throttled to 90% power. 
seconds: Telemetry stops.
This, of course, is merely a phenomenology of the acci dent. We will know more when the right booster is recovered, which is expected soon. There has been a good deal of spec ulation as to why the accident occurred.
Aviation Week magazine has advanced the plausible hy pothesis that at 72 seconds, the righthand booster became unmoored and rotated so that its nose penetrated the main fuel tank, causing the final explosion. Speculation sells news papers, but it will no doubt be some time before the true explanation emerges. The anti-science mob in the press, which led the rallying call to destroy the space program before we even landed on the Moon, and which is now ready to ditch the Space Shuttle program, has claimed that one of the reasons for the Chal-
